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MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO RESTRAIN 
PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES 
Welsh S. White* 
As Yale Kamisar's writings on police interrogation demonstrate,1 
our simultaneous commitments to promoting law enforcement's inter­
est in obtaining confessions and to protecting individuals from over­
reaching interrogation practices have created a nearly irreconcilable 
tension. If the police must be granted authority to engage in effective 
questioning of suspects, it will obviously be difficult to insure that "the 
terrible engine of the criminal law . . .  not . . .  be used to overreach in­
dividuals who stand helpless against it."2 If we are committed to ac­
commodating these conflicting interests, however, some means must 
be found to impose appropriate restraints on the police when they en­
gage in interrogation. 
The Warren Court undoubtedly believed that Miranda's safe­
guards would impose significant restraints on the police, ensuring that 
suspects subjected to custodial interrogation would not only be in­
formed of their constitutional rights but also protected against coer­
cive interrogation practices. Indeed, when Miranda was decided, it was 
widely believed that the Court had imposed inordinate restraints on 
the police. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White asserted that there 
was "every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants 
who otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has pre­
viously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will 
now . . .  either not be tried at all or will be acquitted."3 
Other commentators went further, even suggesting that the Court's 
decision would have the effect of "very nearly" eliminating the 
" 'confession' as an effective . . .  tool [of] . . .  law enforcement."4 Based 
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. Harvard University, 1962; L.L.B. 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1965. - Ed. I would like to thank Yale Kamisar and 
Richard Leo for helpful comments they made on an earlier draft of this article and Douglas 
McKechnie and Gary Regan for excellent research assistance. 
1. Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on lnbau and 
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 732 (1963), re­
printed in y ALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LA w 
AND POLICY 3-4 (1980) [hereinafter KAMISAR, ESSAYS]. 
2. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion), 
quoted in KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1 ,  at 13. 
3 .  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
4. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 
900 (2000) (quoting position paper issued by candidate Richard M. Nixon during the 1968 
presidential campaign). 
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on their assessments of Miranda's probable impact, conservative crit­
ics generally had no doubt that Miranda should be overruled,5 a view 
that precipitated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute considered in 
Dickerson.6 
By the time the Rehnquist Court decided Dickerson· more than 
thirty years later, however, conservatives' perception of Miranda had 
fundamentally changed. In a revealing portion of the Dickerson opin­
ion, Justice Rehnquist seemed to indicate that the Court would not 
"agree with Miranda's reasoning and resulting rule" if it "were . . .  ad­
dressing the issue in the first instance."7 In upholding Miranda against 
constitutional attack, however, he stated that "principles of stare deci­
sis weigh heavily against overruling it now."8 
But if a majority of the Court disagreed with Miranda's constitu­
tional holding, why should it reject an opportunity to overrule or at 
least modify the Warren Court's landmark decision? As the majority 
itself acknowledged,9 stare decisis has not been an impediment to over­
ruling other constitutional decisions, Did the Dickerson Court refuse 
to consider overruling Miranda's constitutional holding simply be­
cause, as Justice Rehnquist put it, the Miranda "warnings have be­
come part of our national culture?"10 Or did Miranda survive because 
the Court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 "at the 
very moment when the [C]ourt's interest in protecting its constitu­
tional turf against'Congressional incursions was at a peak unmatched 
in recent years"?1 1  
Identifying the motives underlying the Court's decision in 
Dickerson is, of course, impossible. In my judgment, however, a major 
reason for the Court's disinclination to overrule Miranda relates to 
Miranda's limitations. By the time the Court confronted the issue in 
Dickerson, it had become obvious that, regardless of what the Warren 
Court might have intended, Miranda's safeguards provide very limited 
restraints on police interrogators. 
To some extent, of course, Miranda's limitations may be attributed 
to post-Miranda decisions. As previous commentators have pointed 
out,1 2 decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have substantially 
5. See id. at 894-906. 
6. Id. 
7. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
8. Id. 
9. See id. 
10. Id. 
1 1 .  Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim: Dislike of Miranda Ruling Fell 
Prey to Desire to Win a Bigger War, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A20. 
12. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators ' 
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 
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weakened Miranda's protections. Indeed, as interpreted by the pres­
ent Court, Miranda essentially provides suspects with just two safe­
guards: first, the suspect will be informed of his four Miranda rights 
prior to police questioning;13 and, second, the suspect has at least a 
theoretical opportunity either to avoid or to halt police questioning by 
invoking his right to remain silent14 or his right to have an attorney 
present.15 
These safeguards are not insignificant. Although there has been 
much dispute relating to Miranda's impact on the police's ability to 
obtain confessions,16 it seems highly likely that, in response to the 
warnings, a small group of suspects who would otherwise make state­
ments to the police choose not to speak.17 In addition, the warnings 
may lead some suspects to invoke their rights at some point during the 
interrogation, thereby reducing the extent of their incriminating 
statements. In the great majority of cases, however, suspects respond 
to the Miranda warnings by waiving their rights.18 Once those rights 
have been waived, the restraints Miranda imposes on police interroga­
tors are minimal. 
For constitutional purposes, however, the question is not whether 
Miranda imposes significant restraints on police interrogators. Rather, 
the question is whether Miranda's safeguards, combined with the 
Court's other constitutional restrictions on interrogation practices, 
provide suspects with sufficient protection against interrogation prac­
tices that should be viewed as pernicious, in the sense that they are 
abusive, overreaching, or otherwise contrary to societal norms. In ad-
(1999); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. Cf. REV. 
99, 100. 
13.  Prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him as evidence, that he has a right 
to have an attorney present during questioning, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one 
will be appointed to represent him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). 
1 4. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time 
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 
Id. at473-74. This language was subsequently interpreted in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975). See infra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
15. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the 
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 474. This language was 
subsequently interpreted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and its progeny. See 
infra text accompanying notes 30-34. 
16. Compare, e.g. , Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty­
Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50  STAN. L. REV. 1 055 
(1998), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996). See generally Leo & White, 
supra note 12, at 399-400. 
17. See Leo & White, supra note 12, at 468-70. 
18. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE 
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 275 (Richard A. Leo & George c. 
Thomas III eds., 1998). 
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dressing this question, I will consider both the effectiveness of the 
safeguards Miranda does provide and the significance of the post­
Miranda Court's nearly total failure to identify pernicious interroga­
tion practices. 
Part I considers the extent to which Miranda's core protections -
informing suspects subject to interrogation of their constitutional 
rights and providing them with an opportunity to halt the interroga­
tion by invoking their rights - protect individuals from pernicious in­
terrogation practices. Part II considers the significance of the post­
Miranda Court's failure to identify and to restrain pernicious interro­
gation practices. Parts III and IV then consider some of the ways in 
which the post-Miranda due process test should be modified so as to 
provide more effective restraints on such practices. Part III addresses 
the problem of identifying pernicious interrogation practices. In ad­
dressing this question, Part III responds to some of Professor Laurie 
Magid's assertions relating to the basis for prohibiting or regulating 
interrogation practices. In particular, it challenges her conclusion that 
the existing empirical evidence fails to prove that police-induced false 
confessions are a problem demanding societal attention. It then dis­
cusses both the proper role of empirical evidence in identifying perni­
cious interrogation practices and the reasons why interrogation prac­
tices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions 
should be prohibited. Based on the principle that interrogation prac­
tices substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions should 
be excluded, Part IV then identifies three police practices that should 
be prohibited or subjected to close scrutiny. Part V then summarizes 
the Article's principal conclusions. 
I. THE LIMITED EFFECT OF MIRANDA'S CORE PROTECTIONS 
In Davis v. United States,19 the Court stated that "the primary pro­
tection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the 
Miranda warnings themselves."20 It added that "[f]ull comprehension 
of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to 
dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process. "21 
Based on this language, the current Court apparently believes that, in 
most instances, interrogators' iteration of the Miranda warnings pro­
vides a suspect with adequate protection from pernicious interrogation 
practices. If the suspect believes she lacks the resources to deal with 
the pressures generated by custodial interrogation, she can invoke one 
of her rights, thereby avoiding interrogation. Moreover, if she decides 
19. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
20. 512 U.S. at 460. 
21. Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)). 
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to waive her Miranda rights but thereafter concludes that her interro­
gators are subjecting her to undue pressure, she has another opportu­
nity to invoke one of her rights, thereby halting the interrogation. 
In the context of twenty-first century interrogation practices, how­
ever, the claim that a suspect's awareness of her rights provides an an­
tidote to the coercive effect of custodial interrogation is either naive or 
disingenuous. In Miranda itself, the Court said that "[t]he circum­
stances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly 
to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his 
interrogators."22 As the length of a custodial interrogation increases, 
the practical significance of the suspect's knowledge of his rights de­
creases. 
In addition, the practices employed by seasoned interrogators will 
often have the effect of undermining a suspect's ability or inclination 
to assert rights.23 Transcripts of modern interrogations indicate that 
police interrogators are often so overwhelmingly in control of the in­
terrogation - dictating the pace of the questioning and the topics un­
der discussion - that the suspect has no practical opportunity to in­
voke his rights during the most critical parts of the interrogation.24 In 
addition, the interrogator's ability to connect with the suspect -
sometimes by establishing a close rapport so that the suspect views the 
interrogator as a mentor or a father figure25 - often renders the sus­
pect unable or disinclined to break the connection by asserting his 
rights. In many cases, the Miranda warnings are therefore inadequate 
to counteract the pressures generated by sophisticated interrogators. 
If a suspect wants to halt an interrogation, moreover, post-Miranda 
cases make it difficult for him to do so. If the suspect invokes his right 
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). In this quote, the Court was talking 
about the suspect's right to remain silent. The same point applies, of course, even if the sus­
pect is given the four Miranda warnings rather than merely informed of his right to remain 
silent. 
23. We know a good deal more about what transpires during an interrogation today 
than we did at the time Miranda was decided, thanks in part to Kamisar's admonition that 
we cannot understand issues relating to police questioning unless we have some under­
standing of "what such questioning is really like." KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1 ,  at 1 
(quoting Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in POLICE 
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 155 (C. Sowle ed., 1962)). 
24. For examples of questioning that is so rapid that the suspect has no practical oppor­
tunity to halt the questioning in order to invoke his rights, see Richard J. Ofshe & Richard 
A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True 
and False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN LAW, POL. & SOC'Y 189, 227-30 (1997) (hereinafter 
Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology] (interrogation of Dante Parker); id. at 231-33 (interroga­
tion of Edgar Garrett). 
25. During Peter Reilly's interrogation, for example, the seventeen-year-old suspect 
came to view his chief interrogator as a father figure. At one point, he even asked if it might 
be possible for him to come and live with the interrogator and his family. See JOAN 
BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN 98 (1977). 
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to remain silent, Michigan v. Mosley26 holds that the police are not re­
quired to cease the interrogation permanently. Rather, after tempo­
rarily halting the interrogation, they can resume questioning so long as 
they "scrupulously honor" the suspect's invocation of his right.27 In 
practice, therefore, a patient interrogator will often be able to proceed 
with an interrogation even after a suspect invokes his right to remain 
silent.28 
If the suspect asserts his right to have an attorney present at ques­
tioning, Edwards v. Arizona29 requires police to end the interrogation 
immediately. Questioning cannot resume until the suspect initiates 
further exchanges with the police.30 Davis v. United States,31 however, 
held that, in order to satisfy Edwards, the suspect "must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to 
be a request for an attorney."32 If the suspect's statements fail to meet 
this test, the police need not even pause for the purpose of clarifying 
the suspect's position.33 They can simply continue the interrogation,34 
perhaps directing their questions to deter or deflect the suspect's re­
quests for an attorney. Post-Miranda decisions therefore permit the 
police to interrogate suspects in ways that prevent the suspect's effec­
tive invocation of his rights.35 
26. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
27. Id. , at 103-04 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
28. See, e.g. , United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that po­
lice "scrupulously honor[ed]" the suspect's right to remain silent even though the same offi­
cer questioned him shortly after he asserted his right); Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 64 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's right to remain 
silent where the same officer sought and obtained the suspect's Miranda waiver nine hours 
after the suspect had initially invoked her right to remain silent). 
29. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
30. See id. at 484-85. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-46 (1983) (Rehnquist, 
J., plurality opinion), a pivotal plurality of the Court interpreted "initiated" broadly, holding 
that the police were permitted to resume interrogation when, after invoking his right to an 
attorney, the suspect said to the police, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" 
31. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
32. Id. at 459. 
33. If, for example, the suspect says, "Maybe I need an attorney," the interrogator could 
either ignore this comment entirely or say something that might deflect the suspect's interest 
in having an attorney. As suggested in the first edition of the lnbau Interrogation Manual, he 
might say, for example, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're telling the truth, 
that's it. You can handle this by yourself." FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962). 
34. See id. 
35. Justice Souter's assessment of suspects subjected to custodial interrogation seems 
apt: "A substantial percentage of them lack anything like a confident command of the 
English language, many are 'woefully ignorant,' and many more will be sufficiently intimi­
dated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament 
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In practice, therefore, Miranda's core protections provide only 
minimal safeguards. Police routinely obtain Miranda waivers, and po­
lice routinely prevent suspects from asserting their Miranda rights 
during post-waiver interrogations. As the Court stated in Davis, "the 
primary," if not the only, protection afforded suspects subjected to in­
terrogation is the information contained in the "Miranda warnings 
themselves. "36 In the context of twenty-first century interrogation 
practices, however, information relating to one's constitutional rights 
provides only minimal protection against pernicious interrogation 
practices. 
II. MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO PROHIBIT PERNICIOUS 
INTERROGATION PRACTICES 
As interpreted by the post-Miranda Court, one of Miranda's most 
striking limitations is its failure to impose significant restraints on po­
lice interrogation practices. Miranda provides virtually no restrictions 
on interrogation practices designed to induce Miranda waivers and on 
interrogation practices employed after waivers are obtained. 
Miranda, of course, could have been interpreted to impose such re­
strictions.37 Miranda itself stated that "the fact of lengthy interroga­
tion . . .  before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused 
did not validly waive his rights."38 This language could have been in­
terpreted to mean that lengthy interrogations are generally impermis­
sible. The Miranda decision's apparent disapproval of interrogation 
techniques described in various interrogation manuals,39 moreover, 
could have been interpreted to prohibit interrogators from employing 
those practices. And Miranda's language imposing a heavy burden of 
waiver on the government40 could have been interpreted to preclude 
interrogators from employing interrogation practices that pressure 
suspects to give up their right to remain silent through pressing them 
to reveal information they are reluctant to disclose. 
But post-Miranda cases have not interpreted Miranda in these 
ways. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever indi-
that the ability to speak assertively will abandon them." Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (Souter, J. ,  
concurring) (citations omitted). 
36. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994). 
37. See generally Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 581 ,  588-90, 608-17 (1979) (arguing that the Miranda's safeguards should be inter­
preted to prohibit other deceptive interrogation techniques). 
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
39. See id. at 449-54. 
40. See id. at 475-76. 
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cated that the length of the interrogation,41 the interrogation tactics 
employed during the interrogation, or pressure exerted on the suspect 
to reveal information he is reluctant to disclose has any bearing on the 
validity of the suspect's Miranda waiver. On the contrary, once the 
suspect validly waives his Miranda rights, the due process voluntari­
ness test provides the only restrictions on police interrogation prac­
tices. 
The restrictions provided by that test are insubstantial. Over the 
past two decades, the Rehnquist Court has indicated that the post­
Miranda due process test is essentially identical to the pre-Miranda 
test.42 As under the old test, confessions induced by force,43 threats of 
force,44 promises of protection from force,45 or by excessively lengthy 
continuous interrogations46 are involuntary. When these extreme 
techniques are absent, however, the voluntariness of a confession is 
determined on the basis of a totality of circumstances test, under 
which a court must assess both the interrogators' practices and the 
suspect's individual characteristics for the purpose of determining 
whether the suspect's will was overborne.47 
Even when it was most rigorously applied, this test imposed few 
limitations on interrogators. Except for the clear prohibition of ex­
treme tactics, such as the use of force or the threat of force, the Court 
provided few, if any, guidelines as to what practices were prohibited. 
Indeed, an interrogation practice impermissible in one case might be 
entirely permissible in another case involving different circum­
stances.48 Interrogators operating in this environment of legal uncer-
41. For lower courts holding a defendant's Miranda waiver valid despite the fact that the 
defendant was subjected to a lengthy interrogation see, for example, State v. Schofield, No. 
23038-1-11, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 1924 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999) (Miranda waiver 
valid despite twelve-hour interrogation); State v. LaPointe, 678 A.2d 942 (Conn. 1996) 
(Miranda waiver valid despite nine-hour interrogation). 
42. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 176 (1986). See generally Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2008-20 (1998) [hereinafter White, Involuntary Confession]. 
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
44. See, e.g. , Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967). 
45. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
46. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (holding that thirty-six hours of 
virtually continuous interrogation is "inherently coercive"). 
47. See cases cited supra note 45; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 
(1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959). 
48. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), for example, the Court expressed disap­
proval for the deceptive strategy employed by the interrogators, thus suggesting that certain 
categories of police trickery might constitute improper interrogation practices. In Spano it­
self, however, the Court stated that the trickery employed was simply "another factor which 
deserves mention in the totality of the situation." 360 U.S. at 323. If the same trickery were 
employed on another suspect under different circumstances, a lower court could thus prop­
erly hold that employing the trickery in those circumstances would not render the suspect's 
confession involuntary. 
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tainty were naturally inclined to err on the side of law enforcement in­
terests, employing any interrogation techniques not expressly prohib­
ited. Lower courts similarly lacked guidelines for applying the volun­
tariness test and struggled to determine whether particular 
interrogation techniques were impermissible. 
Indeed, the limitations of the pre-Miranda voluntariness test 
prompted the Court to seek "some automatic device by which the po­
tential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled."49 
Simultaneously, those concerned with restraining pernicious interroga­
tion practices sought a constitutional rule that would impose effective, 
general restraints on the police.50 Miranda represented the solution to 
these problems. To the extent that the Court intended Miranda to re­
place the due process voluntariness test, however, the Miranda Court 
did not contemplate the important role that the due process voluntari­
ness test would continue to play in regulating post-waiver interroga­
. ti on practices. 
Ironically, Miranda's practical limitations may have derived from 
the fact that Miranda effectively reduced the efficacy of the due proc­
ess voluntariness test. Although the pre-Miranda due process test con­
stantly shifted and evolved,51 the Warren Court applied the test with 
increasing strictness in the decade before Miranda was decided. 
Miranda halted this trend. In the post-Miranda era, the Court has 
equated a confession involuntary under the due process test with one 
that is compelled under the Fifth Amendment privilege.52 In 
Dickerson, the Court acknowledged that, when the police have "ad­
hered to the dictates of Miranda," a defendant will rarely be able to 
make even "a colorable argument that [his] self-incriminating state­
ment was 'compelled.' "53 Lower court decisions corroborate the view 
expressed in Dickerson. A survey of recent decisions suggests that, 
when the police have complied with Miranda, it is very difficult for a 
defendant to establish that a confession obtained after a Miranda 
waiver violated due process.54 
49. Stone, supra note 12, at 103 (quoting WALTER SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND 
SOCIETY 10 (1967)). 
50. See, e.g., KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 25 (advocating that the Court "scrap" 
the voluntariness test and adopt "a more direct approach"). 
SL See generally Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
2195 (1996) (tracing the Court's shifting and evolving application of the due process volun­
tariness test). 
52. See, e.g. , New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984). 
53. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)). 
54. Based on a Westlaw search examining all federal and state cases decided during the 
years 1999 and 2000, it appears that, out of all the cases in those years in which the police 
obtained valid Miranda waivers, there were only four cases in 1999 and five in 2000 in which 
courts held the suspect's post-waiver confession involuntary. See Search of WESTLA W, 
Allfeds and Allstates Library (Oct. 15, 2000) (on file with the author). In at least four of 
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Two factors have contributed to the infrequency with which lower 
courts find due process violations in post-waiver confession cases. 
First, lower courts conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda 
waiver with the test for determining a voluntary confession because 
the tests are so similar. Both tests require the court to assess the "to­
tality of circumstances" to determine whether the suspect's action was 
voluntary.ss Although lower courts generally apply the two tests sepa­
rately,s6 some courts appear to equate a finding that a suspect's 
Miranda waiver was voluntary with a conclusion that her confession 
was also voluntary. A finding that the police have properly informed 
the suspect of his Miranda rights thus often has the effect of minimiz­
ing or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation 
practices. 
Second, the Supreme Court's limited application of the voluntari­
ness test during the post-Miranda era has probably increased lower 
courts' natural inclination to disfavor involuntary confession claims. 
During the thirty-year period prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court 
held confessions involuntary in at least twenty-three cases.s7 In the 
thirty-four years since Miranda, however, it has held confessions in­
voluntary in only two cases: Mincey v. Arizonass (1978) and Arizona v.  
Fulminantes9 (1991). As Professor Louis Michael Seidman has indi­
cated, this "silence at the top" has undoubtedly led some lower courts 
to believe that claims of involuntary confessions need not be treated 
seriously. 60 
Miranda's most significant limitation is thus its failure to identify 
and to prohibit (or even to promote the identification and prohibition 
these cases (two in 1999 and two in 2000), moreover, this holding was based on state consti­
tutional law rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
55. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1994) (applying due process 
voluntariness test to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver). See generally Leo & White, 
supra note 12, at 418. 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that, 
even if suspect's Miranda waiver is valid, the court must still decide whether the officer "co­
erced [him] into confessing"). 
57. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 
(1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); 
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); 
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961 ); Blackburn v. 
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 
356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 
(1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); 
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); Haley 
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316 
U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
58. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
59. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
60. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 745 (1992). 
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of) pernicious interrogation practices. Is it appropriate to leave this 
problem to other institutions, such as legislatures or state courts?61 
Based on the Court's interpretation of both the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause, "interrogation techniques . . .  offensive to a civi­
lized system of justice"62 are unconstitutional. The Court thus has a 
constitutional obligation to address this issue. In order to fill the gap 
left by Miranda and the post-Miranda due process test, the Court 
should formulate rules restricting pernicious interrogation practices. 
III. IDENTIFYING PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES 
What criteria should the Court use to identify pernicious interroga­
tion practices? 
Professor Laurie Magid argues that the primary, if not the sole, cri­
terion for determining whether an interrogation practice is permissible 
is whether the interrogation practice will produce unreliable confes­
sions. 63 Magid apparently agrees that interrogation practices that cre­
ate an "unreasonable risk that an innocent person would falsely con­
fess"64 should be prohibited. 
According to Magid, however, the existing empirical evidence fails 
to establish that police-induced false confessions occur with sufficient 
frequency to invalidate any current interrogation practices or to justify 
additional restraints on police interrogation practices. Specifically, she 
asserts that the few dozen police-induced false confession cases re­
ported by commentators such as Richard A. Leo and Richard J. 
Ofshe65 are insufficient to establish that police-induced false confes­
sions present a societal problem of sufficient magnitude to demand at-
61. Based on prior experience, there is little reason to believe that either state legisla­
tures or Congress would be likely to address this problem in a way that would provide addi­
tional protection for suspects subjected to interrogation. The 1968 Congress's response to 
Miranda's invitation for Congress to provide alternative safeguards for protecting custodial 
suspects' right to exercise their right to remain silent provides an example of the typical leg­
islative response. Instead of providing alternative means of protecting suspects' rights, 
Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which was intended to overrule Miranda. See generally 
Kamisar, supra note 4 (explaining the purpose and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501). 
62. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104, 109 (1985)). 
63. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1 168, 1187 (2001) ("Because the reliability rationale focuses on protecting 
innocent suspects, it offers a more palatable - and appropriate - reason for limiting inter­
rogation."). 
64. Id. at 438. 
65. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (collecting 60 proven and probable police­
induced false confessions) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences]. 
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tention.66 In order to justify additional restraints on interrogation tac­
tics, Magid would require refinements in the research on false confes­
sions. According to her, future research "will need to be based on a 
statistically significant, randomly drawn sample of persons who gave 
confessions during interrogation."67 If such research indicated that few 
innocent suspects falsely confessed, additional restrictions on decep­
tive interrogation practices would be unjustified.68 
Both Magid's standard for determining a pernicious interrogation 
practice and her assessments of the empirical evidence are wrong. In 
view of Miranda's holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies 
to custodial interrogation,69 Magid's claim that the prevention of unre­
liable confessions is the sole (or primary) basis for prohibiting interro­
gation practices cannot be correct. Even if this claim were correct, it 
would not follow that the frequency with which interrogation practices 
induce false confessions in typical cases is the criterion for determining 
whether a problem exists. In my judgment, the empirical evidence suf­
ficiently establishes both that police-induced false confessions occur 
frequently enough to create a serious societal problem and that cur­
rent interrogation practices tend to produce these false confessions. 
In supporting my claims, I will try to explain both the role and the 
limitations of empirical evidence in examining police interrogations. In 
Section A, I will show that reliability cannot be the sole criterion for 
determining whether an interrogation practice is pernicious. In Section 
B, I will assess the role of empirical evidence in determining both the 
frequency of police-induced false confessions and whether that fre­
quency is socially significant. In Section C, I will consider how empiri­
cal evidence may be used to assist in identifying interrogation prac­
tices likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. Finally, in Section 
D, I will explain why the conclusion that an interrogation practice is 
substantially likely to produce an untrustworthy confession should be 
the criterion for determining that an interrogation practice is perni­
cious and warrants prohibition - even without empirical data to 
prove that the practice has actually produced false confessions. 
66. Magid, supra note 63, at 1193. 
67. Id. at 1190. 
68. Id. 
69. As Professor Steven J. Schulhofer has observed, Miranda was in fact predicated on 
"three" holdings. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 
436 (1987). The first was that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the "informal com­
pulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 461. 
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A. Contemporary Standards of Fairness Should Determine the 
Permissibility of Interrogation Tactics 
Skilled interrogators could employ even the most pernicious inter­
rogation tactics in ways that would only produce reliable confessions. 
Indeed, as early continental systems of criminal procedure recognized, 
practices involving torture would produce reliable statements if the 
practices were "employed in such a way" that a guilty suspect would 
be required to reveal merely details corroborating his guilt. Through 
the use of non-suggestive questioning, the interrogator could establish 
the suspect's guilt by forcing him to reveal "information which . . .  'no 
innocent person [could] know. ' "70 As Ofshe and Leo have explained,71 
modem interrogators can apply a variation of this technique to assess 
the reliability of suspects' confessions. By analyzing " [t]he fit between 
the suspect's post-admission narrative and the facts of the crime" the 
interrogator should be able to determine "whether the suspect pos­
sesses actual knowledge of the crime" and thus whether the suspect is 
making a true confession.72 In many cases, therefore, interrogators can 
ensure that the tactics they employ will only be used to produce reli­
able confessions. 
If, as Magid suggests,73 the sole basis for imposing constitutional 
restrictions on interrogation practices is to exclude unreliable confes­
sions, there is no need to prohibit any interrogation practices. Scruti­
nizing the reliability of each suspect's confession would be sufficient to 
protect this constitutional interest. If the government could show cor­
roboration or other circumstances verifying the reliability of a par­
ticular confession, there would be no constitutional basis for exclu­
sion. 74 
As I have already indicated, however, ensuring the reliability of 
confessions is not the sole basis for monitoring police interrogation 
practices. In Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment ap­
plies to custodial interrogation.75 In addition, the pre-Miranda due 
process test barred the government's use of an involuntary confes­
sion. 76 During the post-Miranda era, the Court has conflated these 
70. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 5 (1977). 
71. See Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 198-99. 
72. Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted). 
73. Magid, supra note 63, at 1171. 
74. At least one commentator has essentially adopted this position. Professor Joseph D. 
Grano has asserted that in confession cases the "due process inquiry should focus on the 
likelihood of unreliability in a particular case." Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will 
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 921 (1979). 
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
76. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally Hancock, supra note 
51. 
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protections, holding that confessions involuntary under the due proc­
ess test are also compelled within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.77 
In determining whether a confession is involuntary, however, the 
Court has always examined the interrogation methods employed by 
the police as well as their actual effect on the defendant. Thus, in 
Colorado v. Connelly,78 the Court reiterated that "certain interroga­
tion techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique charac­
teristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of 
justice that they must be condemned."79 In assessing the legitimacy of 
interrogation practices, the focus is thus on the nature of the interro­
gation practice itself, not on whether the practice appeared to have 
produced an unreliable confession. Interrogation practices viewed as 
pernicious based on contemporary standards of fairness should be 
prohibited. 
B .  The Role of Empirical Evidence in Determining Whether Police­
Induced False Confessions Are a Significant Problem 
No one disputes that police-induced false confessions have resulted 
in wrongful convictions during the post-Miranda era. Disagreement 
arises, however, over whether the rate of wrongful convictions is a sig­
nificant social problem and, if so, whether police-induced false confes­
sions lead to a significant percentage of all wrongful convictions. 
Echoing assertions of Paul Cassell,80 Magid has suggested that the 
failure to find police-induced false confessions in a random sample of 
police interrogation cases constitutes strong evidence that police­
induced false confessions are not a serious societal problem.81 But this 
suggestion fails to take account of the context in which police-induced 
false confessions are likely to be found. The existing evidence of 
police-induced false confessions, such as the cases collected by Leo 
and Ofshe,82 seems to establish that such confessions are most likely to 
77. See, e.g. , New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (observing that, in order 
to show his confession was compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
the defendant would have to show that "his statement was coerced under traditional due 
process standards"). 
78. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
79. 479 U.S. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). 
80. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confes­
sions - and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 507 (1998). · 
81.  Magid, supra note 63, at 1190. 
82. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 444-49; see also Welsh S. White, 
False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 133 (1997) (observing that police-induced "false confessions 
are most likely to occur in a small but significant category of cases - high-profile cases in 
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occur in high profile cases. In high profile cases, the police are under 
significant pressure to solve a crime and, because of the magnitude of 
the investigation, are able to devote an unusually large amount of time 
to interrogating suspects.83 In contrast, interrogations conducted in low 
profile cases - the type of case likely to be collected in a random 
sample of interrogations84 - would be much less likely to produce a 
false confession. In low profile cases, interrogators are generally disin­
clined to expend the time or employ the range of tactics likely to pro­
duce an untrustworthy confession. Barring unusual circumstances, 
moreover, suspects in such cases are l ikely to be guilty,85 thus further 
reducing the risk of a false confession.86 A random sample of interro­
gation cases is, therefore, unlikely to resolve the critical questions re­
lating to the magnitude of the problem of police-induced false confes­
sions. 
Examining a sample of wrongful convictions in high profile or po­
tentially capital cases, in contrast, could illuminate the extent to which 
police-induced false convictions precipitate wrongful convictions. If 
one accepts the premise that society should be concerned about 
wrongful convictions in high profile or potentially capital cases, then a 
finding that police-induced false confessions precipitate a significant 
proportion of wrongful convictions in such cases should be sufficient 
to show that police-induced false confessions are a significant prob­
lem. 
Although Magid, Cassell , and others may disagree with me, the 
apparent number of miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases 
seems to me to be sufficiently large to provoke concern.87 Evidence 
which the police have no suspects other than the one who is subjected to interrogation") 
(hereinafter White, False Confessions]. 
83. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common 
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 485 (1996). 
84. See, e.g. , Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). 
85. The leading interrogation manual advises police that they should only use the psy­
chologically-oriented interrogation techniques designed to elicit a confession when they are 
reasonably certain that the suspect is guilty. See Fred E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986). In the typical case, an officer's belief 
that a suspect is guilty is likely to be correct. 
86. If the suspect is guilty, even the most pernicious interrogation tactics will not be 
likely to produce a false confession because, even if the suspect feels compelled to admit 
facts dictated by his interrogators, the essence of the admitted facts - the suspect's commis­
sion of the crime charged-. will likely be true. 
87. See, e.g. , Caitlin Lovinger, Death Row's Living Alumni, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, § 
4, at 1 (observing that "[s]ince the United States Supreme Court reinstated capital punish­
ment in 1976, 566 people have been executed [and] . . .  82 convicts awaiting execution have 
been exonerated - a ratio of 1 freed for every 7 put to death"). See generally Donald A. 
Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 638-39 
(1999) (summarizing data relating to wrongful convidions in capital cases); Daniel Givelber, 
Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do· We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 
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indicating that police-induced false confessions account for a signifi­
cant proportion of such miscarriages of justice would thus indicate that 
police-induced false confessions have contributed to a significant so­
cietal problem. 
A randomly selected sample of cases involving probable wrongful 
convictions in potentially capital cases provides a reasonable source 
for determining the extent to which various causes are likely to pre­
cipitate such convictions. If it appears that police-induced false confes­
sions contributed to a significant proportion of the convictions con­
tained in such a sample, reducing such confessions should properly be 
identified as a priority of our criminal justice system. 
Several collections of proven, or probable, wrongful convictions 
exist.88 In order to determine the extent to which false confessions pre­
cipitate wrongful convictions, however, the collection should meet 
several criteria. First, it should be limited to serious cases. Second, it 
should be large enough so that it is likely to contain a representative 
selection of wrongful convictions in such cases. Third, the collection 
should be selected so that the most important causes of such wrongful 
convictions are unlikely to be either under- or over-represented. 
Fourth, and finally, the causes of the probably wrongful convictions 
should be identified with sufficient clarity so that it can be determined 
whether a police-induced false confession played any significant part 
in precipitating the wrongful conviction. Among the recent collections 
of wrongful conviction cases, the Bedau-Radelet collection of prob­
able miscarriages of justices in capital cases89 comes closest to satisfy­
ing these four criteria. 
Bedau and Radelet identified 350 potentially capital cases in which 
miscarriages of justice90 occurred in America between the years 1900 
and 1985.91 In selecting their cases, the authors relied heavily on previ­
ous research. Consequently, better known and previously researched 
cases were most likely to be included.92 Because their cases are better 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346-58 (1997) (summarizing and interpreting studies of false con­
victions in serious criminal cases). 
88. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); EDWARD 
CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE 
AFTER TRIAL (1996); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); Hugo 
Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). 
89. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 88. 
90. Bedau and Radelet defined miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases as 
"cases in which: (a) The defendant was convicted o(homicide or sentenced to death for 
rape; and (b) when either (i) no such crime actually occurred, or (ii) the defendant was le­
gally and physically uninvolved in the crime." Id. at 45 (emphasis omitted). 
91. See id. at 38. 
92. See id. at 28. 
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known and have been subjected to more intense scrutiny than average 
miscarriage of justice cases, their pool does not represent a random 
sample of miscarriages of justices in potentially capital cases. In addi­
tion Paul Cassell and Stephen J. Markman have challenged the Bedau­
Radelet conclusions in 10 of the 350 cases, asserting that the defen­
dants included in those ten cases were in fact guilty.93 
Nevertheless, the Bedau-Radelet pool would appear to provide a 
representative data set for the causes of miscarriages of justice in po­
tentially capital cases. There is no reason to believe that better known 
miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases resulted from signifi­
cantly different causes than other miscarriages of justice in similar 
cases. The fact that a small percentage of these cases may be inaccu­
rately classified, moreover, would have only a slight bearing on the ex­
tent to which their sample represents the relevant population. There is 
no reason to believe that the possible misclassifications are likely to 
include a disproportionate number of cases involving any particular 
precipitating causes of wrongful convictions. Consequently, any mis­
classifications would simply have the effect of decreasing the size of 
the relevant sample,94 without reducing the validity of generalizations 
relating to the likelihood of particular causes precipitating wrongful 
convictions in potentially capital cases. 
In fourteen of 350 cases, Bedau and Radelet concluded that the re­
cord was too slender to provide any basis for determining the cause of 
the wrongful conviction.95 In the other 336 cases, they concluded that a 
police-induced false confession was a cause of the wrongful conviction 
in 49, or 14.3 % ,  of the cases.96 Of the causes that Bedau and Radelet 
directly linked to the police or prosecution, false confessions ranked 
third. Only perjury by prosecution witnesses (117, or 34.8% )  and mis­
taken eyewitness identifications (56, or 16.7% )97 accounted for more 
wrongful convictions. Even if the Bedau-Radelet sample is limited to 
probably wrongful convictions occurring after Miranda, the percent­
age of wrongful convictions attributable to false confessions declines 
by only 3.5 percentage points; 1 1.4% of the wrongful convictions dur­
ing the post-Miranda era were found to result from false confessions.98 
This figure (11 .4 % )  may be compared with the 37.5% of wrongful 
93. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to 
the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988). For a response to the claims of 
Cassell and Markman, see Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of 
Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988). 
94. See Gross, supra note 83, at 470-71 .  
95.  See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 88, at 64. 
96. See id. at 173-79. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 177-79. 
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convictions resulting from perjured testimony and 24.1 % of wrongful 
convictions resulting from mistaken eyewitness testimony.99 
Since mistaken eyewitness identifications are generally understood 
to be the most frequent cause of wrongful convictions,100 the Bedau­
Radelet study surprised commentators in finding that the percentage 
of wrongful convictions resulting from police-induced false confessions 
was comparable to the percentage resulting from mistaken identifica­
tion witnesses. 101 As Professor Samuel Gross explained in a thoughtful 
article, 102 the Bedau-Radelet results suggest that conventional wisdom 
regarding the causes of wrongful convictions does not necessarily ap­
ply in capital or other high profile cases. In typical felony cases, mis­
taken identification evidence is much more likely to precipitate wrong­
ful convictions than police-induced false confessions. In high profile 
cases, however, where the police have more time to investigate and 
are under greater pressure to make an arrest, the possibility of a po­
lice-induced false confession is much greater than it is in ordinary 
cases. In that context, the chances of error resulting from pol ice­
induced false confessions are comparable to the chances of error re­
sulting from mistaken identifications, the cause that in most contexts 
has been recognized as the most significant precipitator of wrongful 
convictions. 
The Bedau-Radelet data does not, of course, establish even a 
rough estimate of the extent to which police�induced false confessions 
contribute to wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases. In de­
termining whether a phenomenon is of sufficient magnitude to war­
rant societal concern, however, estimating the exact size of the phe­
nomenon is not critical. Wrongful convictions in potentially capital 
cases may be analogized to a particularly virulent disease. If data 
showing that about 10% of the people suffering from a serious disease 
had been injected with a drug that appeared to contribute to the out­
break of the disease, for example, this would be enough to provoke 
concern. The existing data suggests that police-induced false confes­
sions have contributed to producing the "disease" of wrongful convic­
tions in about one-tenth of all cases. Although this data is certainly not 
conclusive, it is sufficient to show that wrongful convictions resulting 
99. See id. 
100. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting Wall's assertion that 
"[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for 
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor - perhaps it is responsible for more 
such errors than all other factors combined"). See generally PATRICK M. WALL, EYE­
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965). 
101. See, e.g. , Gross, supra note 83, at 485 (observing that the Bedau-Radelet data indi­
cates that "false confessions are a much more common cause of errors for homicides than for 
other crimes"). 
102. See Gross, supra note 83. 
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from police-induced false confessions are of sufficient magnitude to 
mandate concern. 
C. The Role of Empirical Evidence in Identifying Interrogation 
Practices Likely to Produce Untrustworthy Confessions 
The common law voluntariness test sought to exclude untrust­
worthy confessions.103 In applying that test, courts relied on intuition 
rather than empirical data to identify interrogation practices likely to 
produce such confessions. Eighteenth-century English courts assumed, 
for example, that confessions induced by threats or promises were in­
herently unreliable.104 Based on this assumption, confessions induced 
by threats or promises were excluded.105 
Over the past two decades, scholars have conducted considerable 
empirical research on police-induced false confessions. As Magid 
points out, 106 commentators not only have collected cases of proven or 
probable police-induced false confessions, but also they have carefully 
examined these confessions to determine why they occurred.107 In 
identifying modern interrogation practices likely to produce untrust­
worthy confessions, it thus seems appropriate to rely on conclusions 
emanating from this empirical data. 
In using data to identify interrogation practices likely to produce 
untrustworthy confessions, however, the focus should be on why false 
confessions occur and " [h]ow . . .  such errors [can] be prevented"108 
rather than on how often false confessions occur or how often par­
ticular tactics have been shown to produce false confessions. When a 
particular interrogation tactic played a major part in producing a false 
confession on even a few occasions, such a tactic should be classified 
as constitutionally suspect. 
It remains disputed whether the documented cases of proven or 
probable police-induced false confessions are aberrations or the "tip 
of the iceberg"109 - representing evidence of many undetected police-
103. See generally 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
822 (Chadbourn ed. 1970) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. 
104. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783). 
105. See id. 
106. Magid, supra note 63, at 1190. 
107. See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, 
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY 235-40, 260-73, 316-20 (1992) (analyzing several British 
cases and one American case in which defendants were charged or convicted on the basis of 
confessions later shown to be false); Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 194-
207 (explaining the psychological processes through which interrogators elicit both true and 
false confessions). 
108. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 492 (emphasis omitted). 
109. Magid, supra note 63, at 1206. 
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induced false confessions.110 But even if there are relatively few police­
induced false confession cases in the total universe of cases, a tactic 
that is shown to have actually produced false confessions in a few 
cases is capable of producing untrustworthy confessions in all cases. 
Barring very unusual circumstances, no interrogation tactic can 
produce a false confession unless the suspect is innocent.111 Thus, the 
fact that an interrogation tactic appears to produce many more true 
confessions than false ones does not indicate whether the tactic is 
likely to produce trustworthy or untrustworthy confessions. The dis­
parity between true and false confessions may be attributable to the 
disproportionate number of the suspects who are guilty rather than 
the particular tactic's tendency to produce true confessions. 
Even a single case in which an interrogation tactic appeared to 
play a major part in producing a false confession is significant. Barring 
some evidence that the tactic had a highly aberrational effect on the 
suspect - perhaps relating to the suspect's unusual psychological 
characteristics - the fact that the tactic caused an innocent person to 
confess provides strong evidence that the tactic will at least sometimes 
lead a typical suspect to agree with the interrogator's version of the 
relevant facts, regardless of her own initial belief in the truth of those 
facts. The tactic will thus have a tendency to produce false confessions 
from innocent suspects and true confessions from guilty suspects. If, as 
appears likely, the tactic's tendency to produce both types of confes­
sions is substantial, it is proper to conclude that the tactic is substan­
tially likely to produce untrustworthy statements. 
D. Why Tactics Substantially L ikely to Produce Untrustworthy 
Confessions Should Be Prohibited 
Most responsible members of society would agree with Magid that 
one standard against which police interrogation techniques should be 
measured is its propensity to produce untrustworthy statements. If 
there is a substantial likelihood that the employment of a particular 
interrogation technique will produce untrustworthy statements, then 
that interrogation technique should at least be viewed as highly prob­
lematic. Support for this principle stems not only from our historical 
concern for guarding against wrongful convictions resulting from 
government-induced confessions, but also from a strong perception 
that both guilty and innocent individuals should be protected against 
the suffering - in terms of both psychological damage and impair­
ment of autonomy - that results from overreaching or abusive inter­
rogation practices. 
1 10. Id. 
1 1 1 .  See id. at ll90. 
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The due process voluntariness test derives from the common law 
rule that excluded involuntary confessions on the ground that they 
were untrustworthy. 11 2  Since empirical data shows that modern jurors 
are likely to give great weight to suspects' confessions, whether or not 
they are reliable,113 the concern for preventing wrongful convictions 
based on false confessions is just as great today as it was when the 
common law rule evolved.114 . 
But preventing the production of false confessions is not the sole, 
or perhaps even the primary, reason for prohibiting interrogation 
practices that are likely to produce untrustworthy statements. In many 
cases, the pressure generated by an interrogation technique and the 
likel ihood that the technique will produce untrustworthy statements 
will be substantially equivalent. As Professor George Thomas has 
pointed out, in most instances a suspect would not falsely "admit guilt 
unless she found the pressure to confess overwhelming." 1 15 Accord­
ingly, an interrogation method likely to produce untrustworthy state­
ments should be constitutionally suspect regardless of whether its use 
in a particular case actually resulted in an unreliable confession. The 
interrogation method is suspect because of the damage it causes to in­
dividual autonomy, as well as because of its potential for producing 
false confessions. 
112. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plural­
ity opinion) (stating that under the Due Process clause " [t]he ultimate test remains that 
which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred 
years: the test of voluntariness"). See generally White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at 
111-13 (tracing the evolution of the due process voluntariness test). 
1 13. See, e.g., Gerald R. Miller & F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their 
Implications for Psychological Research, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 19-38 
(Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1977) (discussing empirical data showing that in a mock trial ex­
periment subjects exposed to various evidence of a suspect's guilt - including identification 
evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the suspect's confession - were "significantly more 
likely" to view the suspect's confession as establishing the suspect's guilt than either of the 
other types of evidence). See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 148, at 316 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) ("[T]he introduction of a con­
fession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all prac­
tical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained."). 
114. The common Jaw rule excluded "involuntary confessions" on the ground that con­
fessions resulting from certain pressures were untrustworthy. See, e.g. , The King v. 
Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783) (explaining that "a confession forced 
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear" must be excluded because it 
"comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that 
no credit ought to be given to it"). See generally White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at 
1 11-12 (citing other early authorities). 
115. George C. Thomas III ,  Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Self­
Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117, 124 (1991). 
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IV. REVIVING THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS TEST TO 
REGULATE INTERROGATION PRACTICES LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
UNTRUSTWORTHY CONFESSIONS 
If interrogation practices substantially likely to produce untrust­
worthy confessions should be prohibited, what new constitutional re­
strictions on interrogation practices are appropriate? In addressing 
this question, it is of course difficult to separate interrogation practices 
from the suspects on which they are employed or the settings in which 
the interrogations take place. In certain contexts, almost any interro­
gation practices are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy con­
fessions. 
Thus, for more than three decades, it has been recognized that 
modern interrogation methods are very likely to produce untrust­
worthy confessions from mentally handicapped suspects. 1 16 Recent 
empirical data suggests that youthful suspects are also especially likely 
to make false statements in response to police interrogation. 1 17 Even 
commentators who are sympathetic toward the interests of law en­
forcement have recognized the need to provide safeguards against the 
risk that standard interrogation methods will precipitate untrust­
worthy confessions from these populations. 1 18 Interrogation techniques 
permissible in other contexts should, therefore, be prohibited when 
interrogators are questioning youthful or mentally handicapped sus­
pects. 
Similarly, considerable evidence suggests that, regardless of the in­
terrogation techniques employed, interrogations extending beyond a 
certain length are likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. 1 19 In 
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,120 which held that a confession following thirty­
six hours of virtually continuous interrogation was involuntary, the 
1 16. See President's Panel on Mental Retardation, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
LAW 33 (1963). 
117. See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, The Maximum Security Adolescent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
1 0, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 60 (observing that the seven- and eight-year-old boys who falsely 
confessed to sexually assaulting and killing eleven-year-old Ryan Harris "were enticed to 
confess over a McDonald's Happy Meal"). See generally Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra 
note 65, at 458. 
1 18. See, e.g. , Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination of Al­
leged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
523, 586 (1999) (observing that special safeguards are needed to protect "mentally retarded" 
suspects when they are interrogated by the police); Fred E. lnbau, Miranda's Immunization 
of Low Intelligence Offenders, 24 PROSECUTOR: J. NAT'L DISTRICT ATT'YS, Spring 1991, at 
9-10 (observing that youthful and mentally handicapped suspects are especially vulnerable to 
police suggestion). 
119. See generally White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 42, at 2046-49 (discussing 
empirical data showing that lengthy interrogations are likely to produce false or untrust­
worthy confessions). 
120. 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
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Supreme Court provided some protection against lengthy interroga­
tions. Based on recent empirical data relating to false confessions, 
however, it appears that interrogations' permissible duration should 
be shortened considerably. Regardless of the interrogation practices 
employed, an interrogation should not be allowed to extend beyond 
some prescribed limit, say six hours.121 
In this Part, I will seek to identify interrogation practices that 
should be viewed as pernicious because of their tendency to produce 
untrustworthy statements when employed on normal suspects during 
an interrogation of reasonable length. The fact that interrogators do 
not generally rely on single tactics in isolation, but rather combine tac­
tics to enhance the overall effectiveness of an interrogation, has two 
implications for this analysis. First, in assessing the likelihood that a 
particular interrogation tactic will produce an untrustworthy confes­
sion, due regard must be given to the fact that the effect of the par­
ticular tactic will generally be magnified by the context and manner in 
which it is used. Second, the fact that interrogators generally employ 
several interrogation tactics in combination makes it more difficult to 
identify particular tactics that are substantially likely to produce un­
trustworthy confessions. Based on the existing empirical data, it may 
be difficul t to determine whether the employment of any particular in­
terrogation tactic would be likely, in isolation, to produce an untrust­
worthy confession. 
Despite these difficulties, it is preferable to establish clear princi­
ples to guide the police and lower courts in determining whether an 
interrogation tactic is pernicious. If particular interrogation tactics 
have a strong tendency to produce untrustworthy confessions when 
employed in the context of a typically intense interrogation, those tac­
tics should be closely regulated. Starting with this premise, I will con­
sider three interrogation tactics that have considerable potential for 
producing untrustworthy statements. The pre-Miranda due process 
test provided some restrictions on each of these practices. In order to 
provide appropriate safeguards against the use of these interrogation 
practices during post-waiver interrogations, however, the restrictions 
must be revived and strengthened. 
A. Threats of Punishment and Promises of Leniency 
At common law, confessions induced by any threat or promise 
were excluded as unreliable.122 This exclusionary principle was 
121. See, e.g., White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 42, at 2049 (arguing that "em­
pirical data showing a relationship between lengthy interrogation and false or untrustworthy 
confessions" supports the conclusion that confessions obtained "after more than six hours" 
of continuous interrogation should be automatically excluded). 
122. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 836, at 275. 
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adopted in America during the nineteenth century. In 1896, Russell on 
Crimes, a leading criminal law treatise, asserted that, in order to be 
admissible, a confession could not be obtained by any direct or im­
plied promise.123 One year later, in Bram v. United States,124 the 
Supreme Court adopted this rule as a matter of constitutional law, 
holding that the admission of a confession induced by "any direct or 
implied promise, however slight,"125 violated the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
Over the next century, Bram exerted only limited influence. In ap­
plying the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, the Court never rigorously 
applied Bram's prohibition. In one case, it held that a confession that 
occurred after the defendant negotiated "a bargain with the police and 
the parole officers" was valid;126 in two other cases, it held that confes­
sions induced by threats of harsh punishment and express or implied 
promises of significant leniency were involuntary127 but did not specify 
that the threats or promises were sufficient in themselves to dictate ei­
ther result.128 In the post-Miranda case of Arizona v. Fulminante,129 the 
Court expressly repudiated Bram's holding prohibiting confessions in­
duced by any promises, stating that that rule "does not state the stan­
dard for determining the voluntariness of a confession."130 
Fulminante's limitation of Bram nevertheless leaves open the pos­
sibility of barring confessions induced by promises that are substan­
tially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. As Wigmore ob­
served, the premise that confessions produced by any promises are 
untrustworthy was probably never correct.131 If the inducement to con­
fess is relatively slight - a promise that the officer will testify that the 
123. See 3 WILLIAM 0LDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896) [hereinafter 
RUSSELL ON CRIMES]. 
124. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
125. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)). 
126. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953). 
127. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). 
128. In Leyra, the interrogator told the suspect he would have "a much better chance" if 
he "play[ed] ball" with the interrogators, and that " [t]hese people are going to throw the 
book at you unless you can show that in a fit of temper, you got so angry that you did it. 
Otherwise they toss premeditation in and it's premeditation. See?" Leyra, 347 U.S. at 583-84 
(Appendix to Opinion of the Court). In holding the defendant's confession involuntary, the 
Court referred to the interrogator's "threat[s]" and "promise[s] of leniency." Id. at 559. In 
Lynumn, the interrogator told the defendant that if she did not confess she could get ten 
years and her children would be taken away and that if she did confess the interrogator 
would recommend mercy and see that she kept her children. 372 U.S. at 531-32. In a terse 
opinion, the Court held that the interrogator's statements to the defendant rendered her 
confession involuntary. Id. at 534. 
129. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
130. Id. at 285. 
131 .  See 3 WIG MORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 836, at 238. 
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suspect cooperated,132 for example - there is little reason to believe 
that a suspect will respond with a false confession. 
The likelihood that a promise will produce a false confession is 
substantially greater, however, when an interrogator promises a sus­
pect that, if he confesses, he will not be charged at all or will be 
granted leniency. Based on the advice provided in the leading interro­
gation manual, one of the interrogator's goals is to convince the sus­
pect that the police either already have or will be able to obtain evi­
dence that establishes the suspect's guilt.133 In this context, an innocent 
suspect might rationally conclude that confessing in exchange for a 
promise of leniency is in his best interest. After hearing the police re­
peatedly state that they have or will have evidence of his guilt, the 
suspect might believe that, if he does not confess, the police intend ei­
ther to frame him for a crime he did not commit or to present genuine 
evidence that could result in conviction despite his innocence. An in­
nocent suspect might thus believe that a false confession in exchange 
for leniency is his best alternative. 
Recent empirical data support the conclusion that threats of pun­
ishment and promises of leniency sometimes produce false confes­
sions. In their analysis of sixty proven or probable false confessions, 
Professors Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Ofshe identified this tactic 
as one that played a major role in precipitating several false confes­
sions. In one case, for example, a seventeen-year-old suspect falsely 
confessed to stabbing her mother after an interrogator told her she 
would die in the electric chair if she maintained her innocence.134 And 
in another, a young woman falsely confessed to shoving her boyfriend 
off a trail 320 feet above the Oregon coast after the police "creat[ ed] 
the impression that her admission . . .  carried no punishment."135 
Both empirical data and precedent thus support imposing a prohi­
bition on inducing confessions through threats or promises. Since the 
prohibition's underlying purpose is to bar threats or promises that are 
substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, the test 
should focus on the suspect's interpretation of the interrogator's words 
rather than on whether the interrogator's words constitute an explicit 
threat or a binding promise . When the suspect would be likely to in­
terpret the interrogator's words as constituting a threat of serious ad­
verse consequences if he doesn't confess or a promise of significant le­
niency if he does, empirical data as well as intuition suggest that even 
an innocent suspect will be quite likely to confess rather than risk the 
132. See, e.g., State v. Fuqua, 152 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. 1967) (excluding confession be­
cause officer told suspect he would testify that the suspect cooperated with the investiga­
tion). 
133. lNBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 131. 
134. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 475-76. 
1 35. Id. at 470-71 .  
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consequences of maintaining his innocence. To impose a restriction 
that will provide adequate protection against inducements that are 
substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, interroga­
tors should thus be prohibited from making statements (or engaging in 
conduct) that would be likely to lead the suspect to believe that he will 
suffer serious adverse consequences if he doesn't confess or be 
granted significant leniency if he does. 
Adopting this rule will not adversely affect law enforcement. The 
leading interrogation manuals admonish interrogators to refrain from 
inducing confessions through threats or promises of leniency.136 Thus 
interrogators who scrupulously adhere to the manuals' recommenda­
tions will not violate this rule. Moreover, the scope of the rule is lim­
ited. Promises to testify to the suspect's cooperation137 or to inform the 
prosecuting attorney of such cooperation138 would be permitted. Simi­
larly, statements to the effect that confession will make the suspect 
feel better or be good for his soul would not necessarily be impermis­
sible. The benefits offered by such promises seem either too insubstan­
tial or too collateral to the criminal litigation to be likely to induce an 
untrustworthy confession. 
Determining whether an interrogator is threatening the suspect 
with a punishment if he doesn't confess or promising him significant 
leniency if he does will sometimes be difficult. As Professor Philip 
Johnson has said, "the difference between expressions of compassion­
ate understanding on the one hand, and implied promises of leniency 
on the other, is at the margins sometimes a matter of emphasis and 
nuance."139 Similarly, a fine line will sometimes exist between implied 
threats and statements that merely suggest the possibility of adverse 
consequences. 
In determining whether an interrogator's statements to the suspect 
constitute a prohibited threat or promise, an objective standard -
which considers the probable perceptions of both the interrogator and 
the suspect subjected to interrogation - should be adopted. If the in­
terrogator should be aware that either the suspect or a reasonable per­
son in the suspect's position would perceive that the interrogator's 
statements indicate that the suspect would be likely to receive signifi-
136. See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 114 ("In applying this technique of con­
demning the accomplice, the interrogator must proceed cautiously and must refrain from 
making any comments to the effect that the blame cast on an accomplice thereby relieves the 
suspect of legal responsibility for his part in the commission of the offense."). 
137. See supra note 132. 
138. See, e.g. , Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237, 239 (Miss. 1989) (holding that promise to 
inform prosecuting attorney that the suspect was cooperating did not render suspect's con­
fession involuntary). See generally George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne 
LaFave's Bright Line Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207 [hereinafter Dix, Promises] . 
139. Philip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 303, 310-1 1 (1986). 
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cant leniency if he did confess or significant adverse consequences if 
he didn't, then the interrogator's statements should be viewed as im­
proper and a confession occurring as a result of such statements 
should be excluded as involuntary. 
Examples drawn from two cases illustrate how the test should be 
applied. In Miller v. Fenton,1 40 Detective Boyce, who was investigating 
the murder of seventeen-year-old Deborah Margolin, interrogated 
Frank Miller for approximately one hour. During the course of the in­
terrogation, Boyce repeatedly suggested to Miller that, if he confessed, 
Boyce would see to it that he received "help" rather than being 
treated as a criminal. At one point, for example, Boyce told Miller that 
the person responsible for the killing was "not a criminal. " 14 1 He went 
on to say that the perpetrator had " [a] problem, and a good thing 
about that Frank, is a problem can be rectified. "142 After Miller 
agreed, Boyce developed his implicit proposal to Miller as follows: "I 
want to help you. I mean I really want to help you, but you know what 
they say, God helps those who help themselves, Frank."143 
Boyce was never explicit about the kind of "help" that he hoped to 
provide for Miller. At one point, however, he asked Miller, "If I 
promise to, you know, do all I can with the psychiatrist and everything, 
and we get the proper help for you, . . .  will you talk to me about it?"144 
Miller never answered this question,145 and some of his responses to 
Boyce indicated that, despite Boyce's statements, he believed he 
would be treated as a criminal if he confessed.146 Nevertheless, Miller · 
eventually confessed to the killing. 
Under the proposed approach, the first question is whether Boyce 
should be aware that a reasonable person in Miller's position would 
believe that, if he confessed, he would be likely to receive significant 
leniency. Although Boyce never explicitly promised Miller leniency in 
exchange for a confession, his statements taken as a whole would cer­
tainly suggest to a reasonable person that if he "helped" Boyce by 
confessing to the crime, he would not be treated as a criminal, but 
rather would receive the psychiatric help he needed. The promise of 
psychiatric help (presumably at a mental hospital) rather than pun­
ishment as a criminal certainly constitutes a promise of significant le-
140. 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986). 
141. Id. at 618 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 622. 
145. His immediate response, "I can't talk to you about something I'm not . . .  " was in­
terrupted by Boyce. Id. 
146. See id. at 633 (Appendix) (After Boyce said, " I  don't think you're a criminal, 
Frank," Miller responded, "No, but you're trying to make me one."). 
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niency. Boyce's statements to Miller thus constituted an improper 
promise. 
Should Miller's confession following Boyce's promise be excluded 
as involuntary? Based on the statements he made to Boyce, Miller did 
not appear to believe that he would receive psychiatric treatment 
rather than being treated as a "criminal" if he confessed. The govern­
ment might thus claim that, even if Boyce made an improper promise, 
Miller's confession should not be excluded as involuntary because 
Boyce's promise did not induce the confession. 147 
In determining whether a promise induced a confession, the focus 
should be on whether the promise played any part in precipitating the 
confession. If Miller did not believe that Boyce had made a promise or 
was certain that whatever promise Boyce made would not be kept, 
Miller's confession should be admitted. Miller's skepticism as to 
Boyce's intentions should not be sufficient, however, to negate a 
finding that the promise induced the confession. Even if Miller be­
lieved that Boyce was unlikely to honor his implied promise, he might 
have been induced by the promise to believe there was "a small open 
window at the top of [a] long wall"148 through which he could miracu­
lously escape the possibility of punishment. In the context of custodial 
interrogation, a suspect can be induced to confess by a promise even 
when he believes there is only a remote chance that the terms of the 
promise will be fulfilled. 
Indeed, when a suspect's confession follows a promise of leniency, 
the conclusion that the promise did not induce the confession is gener­
ally implausible. Even if the suspect is aware that he is grasping at 
straws, the promise probably played some part in precipitating the 
confession. Barring unusual circumstances, such as an explicit clarifi­
cation of the officer's authority to make promises,149 a confession fol­
lowing such a promise should be viewed as induced by the promise 
and, therefore, involuntary. 150 Since Miller's confession followed 
Boyce's implied promise of leniency, his confession should be ex­
cluded. 
As a second example, consider the interrogation of Leo Bruce, 
who was suspected of murdering nine people at a Thai Buddhist Tem­
ple west of Phoenix, Arizona. After his arrest, Bruce was questioned 
by several officers, including FBI Agent Casey.151 Near the beginning 
1 47. In Miller, the majority opinion took this position. 796 F.2d at 61 1-12. 
148. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE 209 (1991 ). 
149. If, in response to a request for clarification, Boyce told Miller that he had no 
authority to make a promise that would be binding on the prosecutor, it could be found ei­
ther that Boyce made no implied promise of leniency or that the promise he did make did 
not induce Miller's confession. 
1 50. Accord Dix, Promises, supra note 138, at 259. 
151 .  See Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May, 1 993, at 58. 
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of the interrogation, Casey falsely told Bruce that the police had evi­
dence showing that he was at the temple on the night of the killings. 
After Bruce denied ever being there, Casey said to him, "The best 
thing to do is to cooperate now . . . .  Don't you think it's smart to get 
your version of the story down . . . before everybody else gives 
theirs?"152 When Bruce continued to deny he had been at the temple, 
Casey told Bruce that, if he stuck with that story, he was "gonna end 
up being sorry, I think."153 He added, "You're making a mistake by 
not cooperating at this point."154 Bruce continued to deny his involve­
ment. Eventually, however, he confessed to the killings.155 
In this case, the critical question is whether Casey should have 
been aware that a reasonable person in Bruce's situation would be­
lieve that he was being threatened with significant adverse conse­
quences if he didn't confess. Casey's comments suggesting that it 
would be "smart" for Bruce to get his story down before other sus­
pects gave theirs could not reasonably be interpreted as communicat­
ing such a threat. The comments do, of course, suggest that Bruce will 
obtain some advantage by admitting his involvement so that he can get 
his "version of the story down" first. But there is no suggestion that 
getting his version down first will lead to any concrete benefit relating 
to the disposition of his case. At most, Casey's comments seem to sug­
gest that if Bruce tells his story before the others tell theirs, the 
authorities will be more likely to believe his story, thus making it less 
likely that other suspects will later be able to convince the authorities 
that Bruce is more blameworthy than his statement indicates. 
Casey's additional statement to the effect that Bruce "will end up 
being sorry" if he doesn't cooperate obviously comes closer to articu­
lating a threat. Arguably, a reasonable person might take this lan­
guage to mean that serious adverse consequences would accrue to him 
if he failed to comply with the Agent's suggestion that he "cooperate" 
through making a statement admitting his involvement. On the other 
hand, when considered in the context of Casey's other statements, the 
suggestion that Bruce would be "sorry" if he didn't make a statement 
might more reasonably be interpreted as merely reinforcing the sug­
gestion contained in the earlier statements: if Bruce didn't provide the 
police with his own inculpatory statement, he might later regret his 
failure to cooperate because the police would then be more inclined to 
believe other suspects' statements incriminating Bruce. Even though 
the words, "You'll end up being sorry," have an ominous ring, they are 
152. Id. at 59. 
153. Id. at 60. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. Bruce was never brought to trial, however, because subsequently discovered 
evidence established that his confession was false. Id. 
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not on the same order as, "You'll lose your chance for being treated as 
a lesser offender," or other words that might suggest that the failure to 
cooperate would lead to tangible consequences relating to sentencing 
or disposition of the case. 
Although the question is close, Agent Casey's statements to Bruce 
should not be interpreted as communicating a threat that his failure to 
confess would lead to adverse consequences. Accordingly, Bruce's 
confession should not be involuntary on the ground that it was in­
duced by an improper threat or promise. 
B .  Threats of Adverse Consequences to a Friend o r  Loved One 
In pre-Miranda due process cases, the Court's view of police trick­
ery was ambivalent. In a few cases - most notably, Spano v. New 
York156 - the Court indicated that police trickery was a factor con­
tributing to its conclusion that the suspect's confession was involun­
tary . 157 The Court never indicated, however, that any particular sort of 
police trickery would be sufficient by itself to render a confession in­
voluntary. Indeed, in Frazier v. Cupp,158 the Court held that a confes­
sion induced by trickery that both misrepresented the strength of the 
evidence against the suspect159 and minimized the suspect's culpability 
for the offense160 was voluntary.161 While stating that the interrogating 
officer's trickery was "relevant" under the due process test, it con­
cluded that the trickery was insufficient to render the confession in­
voluntary.162 
156. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
157. See id. at 322-23. In Spano, the suspect's childhood friend, who was then a police 
officer, falsely told the suspect that his job would be in jeopardy if the suspect did not con­
fess. The Court condemned this tactic, observing that it was "a factor" that in conjunction 
with other factors resulted in an involuntary confession. See id. at 323. In Leyra v. Denno, 
347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954), the defendant, who was suffering from painful sinus headaches, 
requested the assistance of a doctor. The chief interrogator introduced him to a doctor who 
was supposed to provide the defendant with medical relief. See id. In fact, however, the 
"doctor" who met with the defendant "was not a general practitioner but a psychiatrist with 
considerable knowledge of hypnosis." Id. Instead of providing the defendant with medical 
relief, the "psychiatrist by subtle and suggestive questioning simply continued the police ef­
fort . . .  to induce [the suspect] to admit his guilt." Id. In holding the suspect's confession in­
voluntary, the Court treated this trickery as an important factor in the totality of circum­
stances. See id. 
158. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
159. The interrogating officer falsely told the defendant that his confeder�te had con­
fessed. See id. at 737. 
160. The officer also "sympathetically suggested that the victim had started a fight by 
making homosexual advances." Id. at 738. 
161. See id. at 739. 
162. See id. 
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Although the Court's dicta in Spano - which strongly condemned 
the deceptive tactics employed in that case163 - seemed to suggest that 
some types of police trickery are worse than others, the Court has 
never articulated any basis for evaluating the propriety of particular 
types of interrogators' trickery. Based on the concern for prohibiting 
interrogation tactics that are substantially likely to produce untrust­
worthy statements, the Court should distinguish between different 
forms of trickery on the basis of whether or not the trickery has the 
potential for producing a false confession. This approach is consistent 
with Spano because, as lower courts have pointed out, 164 the type of 
trickery employed in that case did have the potential for precipitating 
a false confession. 
In Spano, Bruno, the defendant's childhood friend and a "fledg­
ling" police officer, falsely told the defendant that the defendant's 
failure to confess would cause him to lose his job as a police officer, 
resulting in dire consequences not only for himself but also for his wife 
and children. Bruno's trickery could be classified as informing the sus­
pect that a friend or loved one will suffer adverse consequences unless 
the suspect confesses. Both intuition and empirical data165 suggest that 
this type of trickery does have substantial potential for precipitating 
false confessions. In the context of a police interrogation,, a suspect 
might easily be led to feel that protecting his friend or loved one from 
imminent harm is more important than the future consequences of 
confessing. Based on an appropriate reading of Spano, interrogators 
should thus be prohibited from informing a suspect that his failure to 
confess will lead to serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved 
one. 
If this prohibition is adopted, how should a court determine 
whether an interrogator is making a prohibited threat? Since the pro­
hibition is designed to deter a pernicious interrogation practice, the 
court's ultimate focus should be on the interrogator.166 In assessing 
163. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). 
164. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DuPree, 275 A.2d 326, 327 (Pa. 1971) (citing Spano as 
an example in which "police employ threats likely .to produce a false, involuntary confes­
sion"). 
165. In at least one of Leo and Ofshe's collection of "proven" false c<;mfession cases, this 
tactic seems to have played a critical part in producing a false confession. During Dante 
Parker's interrogation, the police indicated to Parker that if he didn't confess,' the police 
would arrest and humiliate Parker's brothers, T.C. and Peter. One officer articulated the 
threat as follows: "They're gonna hit that house big time, T.C.'s gonna go down right in front 
of his kids.''. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at.230. According to Ofshe and 
Leo, this "threat precipitated Parker's false confession, and he began the process of invent­
ing answers to the interrogators' questions." Id. 
166. Adopting an objective focus for the purpose of determining whether an interroga­
tion practice is impermissible is consistent with the Court's approach in dealing with other 
interrogation issues. See, e.g. , Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (whether sus­
pect was in custody within the meaning of Miranda must be determined by assessing "how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"); Rhode 
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particular inducements, a reasonable interrogator's perception of how 
the suspect would view the inducement would be critical. If a reason­
able interrogator would believe that his inducement would cause the 
suspect to feel that he was confronted with the alternatives of con­
fessing or causing serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved 
one, the interrogator's inducement should be impermissible. 
· 
If an interrogator tells the suspect, for example, that the police will 
take his wife or friend into custody if he doesn't confess, the question 
of whether this constitutes a threat of serious adverse consequences to 
the suspect's wife or friend should be determined on the basis of the 
interrogator's perception of how the suspect would be likely to view 
this statement. If the interrogator knows that the suspect's wife suffers 
from arthritis, 167 then the interrogator should certainly be aware that 
the suspect would be likely to believe that the interrogator was trying 
to induce a confession by threatening his wife with serious adverse 
consequences. Similarly, if the interrogator had reason to believe that 
the suspect would be likely to believe that taking a person into custody 
amounts to an arrest or other serious curtailment of liberty, then the 
statement that his wife or a friend is going to be taken into custody 
should qualify as an impermissible threat, regardless of his wife's or 
friend's physical condition. 
Since the interrogation tactic is problematic because of its potential 
for producing untrustworthy statements, it should not matter in theory 
whether the interrogator is misrepresenting his intentions when he 
tells a suspect that his failure to confess will lead to consequences for a 
third party. In practice, however, when the interrogator is lying to the 
suspect, there would seem to be a much greater likelihood that the in­
terrogator believes that the suspect would perceive that, if he doesn't 
confess, his friend or loved one would suffer serious adverse conse­
quences. In most instances, therefore, the interrogator's misrepresen­
tation as to the effect that a suspect's failure to confess would have for 
a third party should be strong evidence that the interrogator is em­
ploying an impermissible interrogation practice. 
C. Misrepresenting the Evidence Against the Suspect 
Misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against the suspect is 
another interrogation tactic that has the potential for producing false 
confessions. When confronted with an interrogator's claim that the 
evidence overwhelmingly establishes his guilt, some suspects will be 
inclined to believe either that continued resistance is futile (because 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (interrogation includes "words or actions on the part 
of the police . . .  that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect"). 
167. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961). 
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the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence) 
or that he is in fact guilty. Not every such misrepresentation, however, 
is likely to produce untrustworthy statements. If the police tell a sus­
pect they are confident they will find evidence establishing his guilt, or 
even that they have witnesses who will testify against him, an innocent 
suspect would be unlikely to confess. Even assuming he credits the in­
terrogator's statements, he would be inclined to believe that the police 
or the witnesses are simply mistaken. On the other hand, if the inter­
rogator shows the suspect a fabricated laboratory report indicating 
that the suspect's semen stains were found on the victim's under­
wear,168 an innocent suspect might rationally conclude that the gov­
ernment's irrefutable (even if mistaken) proof of his guilt mandates 
his confession. 
When should the tactic of misrepresenting the evidence against the 
suspect be impermissible? In view of the concern for prohibiting inter­
rogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy state­
ments, the test should be whether the interrogators employed a tactic 
that would be likely to induce the suspect to believe that the evidence 
against him is so overwhelming that continued resistance is futile. 
When this test is met, there is a substantial risk that the suspect will 
simply make the statements sought by the interrogator, regardless of 
whether those statements are true. In determining whether this test is 
met, the court should consider the type of evidence misrepresented, 
the nature and quality of the misrepresentation, the extent to which 
the misrepresented evidence seems to establish the suspect's guilt, and 
the suspect's apparent vulnerability. 
Misrepresentations relating to forensic or scientific evidence are 
particularly likely to convince suspects that further resistance is futile. 
Most people believe that evidence obtained through accepted scien­
tific procedures - fingerprints, ballistic reports, or DNA evidence, for 
example - is not only reliable, but irrefutable. Empirical data support 
this conclusion. Based on their examination of false confession cases, 
Ofshe and Leo report that "false evidence ploys based on scientific 
procedures" are more likely than " [f]alse evidence ploys based on 
eyewitness reports" to induce an innocent person to confess falsely.169 
Both intuition and the available empirical data thus suggest that mis­
representing the forensic or scientific evidence against the suspect 
168. See State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (1989). 
169. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at 202. As the authors state, 
" [f]alse scientific evidence can be presented so as to leave little opportunity for counters. 
Interrogators represent positive results of fingerprint, hair or DNA tests as error free and 
therefore unimpeachable." Id. Effective use of. this ploy diminishes the suspect's ability to 
resist the interrogator's insistence on his guilt. 
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should in some circumstances be an impermissible interrogation tactic 
because of its potential for producing untrustworthy statements.170 
Because scientific evidence has an inordinate potential for con­
vincing a suspect that continued resistance is futile, misrepresenting 
the scientific evidence against the suspect should be impermissible 
whenever the misrepresented evidence would be sufficient to establish 
the suspect's guilt. Under this test, interrogators should certainly be 
barred from fabricating laboratory reports indicating that semen stains 
on the victim's underwear came from the suspect. Since, in most cases, 
manufacturing a false report would not be necessary to convince a 
suspect of the scientific evidence's validity, falsely informing the sus­
pect of scientific evidence sufficient to establish his guilt - telling him, 
for example, that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the 
crime 171 or that his shoes matched tracks left by the perpetrator172 -
should also be impermissible. In both instances the interrogator's 
statements would be likely to lead an innocent suspect to believe that 
irrefutable proof of his guilt mandated his confession. 
The tactic of falsely informing a suspect that he has failed a poly­
graph test presents a more difficult issue. An interrogator employing 
this tactic is misrepresenting scientific evidence; but the deception 
does not suggest to the suspect that the police will be able to present 
irrefutable proof of his guilt. A knowledgeable suspect would pre­
sumably be aware that polygraph results can be mistaken and that 
such results are not admissible in court. Nevertheless, empirical data 
indicate that this form of deception can have a powerful impact on in­
nocent suspects. The Leo-Ofshe study of false confession cases indi­
cates that, in at least two cases, 173 misrepresenting polygraph results 
played a major role not only in precipitating an innocent suspect's con­
fession but also in leading the suspect to believe, at least temporarily, 
that he was in fact guilty. 
Since the constitutional prohibition should only apply to exclude 
interrogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy 
statements, the tactic of misrepresenting polygraph results should 
170. In Cayward, the court distinguished between verbal misrepresentations and "manu­
facturing false documents" for the purpose of misrepresenting the strength of the govern­
ment's case, stating that neither the suspect's nor the public's expectations "encompass the 
notion that the police will knowingly fabricate tangible documentation or physical evidence 
against an individual." 552 So. 2d at 974. In particular, the court expressed the concern that 
"[a] report falsified for interrogation purposes might well be retained and filed in police pa­
perwork," with the result that they might unintentionally "be admitted as substantive evi­
dence against the defendant." Id. at 974-75. 
171. But see Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 1986) (admitting con­
fession). 
172. But see State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 144 (N.C. 1983) (admitting confession). 
173. The two cases involved Peter Reilly, who falsely confessed to killing his mother, 
and Tom Sawyer, who falsely confessed to killing a young woman who lived near him. For a 
discussion of these cases, see White, False Confessions, supra note 82, at 128. 
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probably not be absolutely prohibited. As this example indicates, 
however, any tactic that distorts the suspect's perception of the scien­
tific or forensic evidence relating to his participation in the crime does 
have some tendency to precipitate a false or untrustworthy statement. 
When such a tactic is employed, the court should at least closely scru­
tinize both the circumstances of the interrogation and the apparent 
vulnerability of the suspect, examining the extent to which the misrep­
resentation would be likely to precipitate an untrustworthy confession. 
When the tactic has been employed on a youthful or mentally handi­
capped suspect, for example, a court should conclude that the interro­
gator's use of the tactic rendered the suspect's confession involuntary. 
In determining whether a particular misrepresentation of govern­
ment evidence will be impermissible, the extent and nature of the mis­
representation is also significant. In Miranda, the Court disapproved 
of the "reverse line-up" tactic. In a reverse line-up, the "accused is 
placed in a line-up" and then falsely "identified by several fictitious 
witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses."174 
When police employ this tactic, there is obviously a concern that even 
innocent suspects "will become desperate and confess to the offense 
under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations."175 
If, rather than conducting a "reverse line-up," the police simply ar­
ranged to have a number of fictitious witnesses dramatically identify 
the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime under investigation, the 
tactic should still be impermissible. Even though suspects can be ex­
pected to know that witnesses are often mistaken, the power of the 
false evidence - in terms of both its apparent value to the prosecution 
and its vivid communication to the suspect - could easily convince an 
innocent suspect that continued resistance would be futile. 
Although the test may prove difficult to apply, it should promote 
distinctions between reasonable and pernicious police practices. In 
Leo Bruce's interrogation, for example, the police took Bruce to a 
property room, showing him "photographs of enlarged fingerprints 
and other items of trace evidence, a floor plan of the temple, and a 
chart listing the names of Bruce's alleged associates."176 If Bruce's in­
terrogators had falsely indicated that Bruce's fingerprints were found 
at the crime scene, this interrogation tactic should be impermissible. If, 
on the other hand, they falsely asserted that the forensic evidence, 
such as the fingerprints, established the guilt of Bruce's alleged associ­
ates, but they said nothing about whether it established Bruce's par­
ticipation, the tactic should be permissible. 
174. 384 U.S. at 453 (quoting O'HARA, FuNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
106 (1956)). 
175. Id. 
176. Parloff, supra note 151, at 60. 
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Classifying the interrogation tactic will not always be clear. If the 
police in the Bruce case not only indicated that the forensic evidence 
established the guilt of Bruce's alleged associates, but also stated (or 
intimated) that those associates were incriminating Bruce, the case 
would fall in the gray area. In determining whether this type of mis­
representation would be likely to convince an innocent suspect that 
further resistance was futile, a court would have to assess not only the 
exact nature of the misrepresentation, but also other factors - in­
cluding the vividness with which the misrepresentation was made and 
the suspect's apparent powers of resistance. If, during the course of a 
lengthy interrogation, the interrogator repeatedly falsely indicated to 
the suspect that others whose.guilt was established were unequivocally 
implicating him, the court should probably hold that the interrogation 
tactic was impermissible on the ground that it would be likely to con­
vince even an innocent suspect that further resistance to the interroga­
tor would be futile. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, Miranda is a paradoxical decision. Among the 
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions, it has precipitated the 
most controversy and debate. As the Dickerson majority stated, 
moreover, the Miranda "warnings have become a part of our national 
culture."177 Nevertheless, as interpreted by the post-Miranda Court, 
the extent to which Miranda's safeguards protect suspects from perni­
cious interrogation practices is extremely limited. 
By requiring the police to warn suspects of their constitutional 
rights before subjecting them to custodial interrogation, Miranda does 
provide suspects with at least a theoretical opportunity to avoid inter­
rogation or to halt it after it begins by invoking one of their rights. In 
practice, however, the vast majority of suspects waive their Miranda 
rights and submit to interrogation. Once the interrogation begins, the 
suspect's awareness of his rights fails to provide significant protection 
from pressures generated by sophisticated interrogators. Interrogators 
have the ability to structure the interrogation in such a way that the 
suspect will be deterred from successfully invoking his rights. 
In addition, Miranda provides virtually no restrictions on the inter­
rogation practices police are permitted to employ once the suspect 
waives his rights and submits to an interrogation. Indeed, Miranda 
may have had the unintended effect of reducing the extent to which 
the due process voluntariness test provides protection against such in­
terrogation practices. As a result, although the Court has indicated 
177. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
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that interrogation practices viewed as pernicious by society are pro­
hibited, constitutional restrictions on such practices are minimal. 
In order to address this problem, the Court first needs to deter­
mine what interrogation practices should be viewed as pernicious, and 
then to develop constitutional principles that will prohibit or restrain 
such practices. In this Article, I have argued that the Court should re­
furbish the due process voluntariness test so as to prohibit interroga­
tion practices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy 
, statements. By taking this approach, the Court will not only fill a sig­
nificant gap left by Miranda but also come closer to insuring that "the 
terrible engine of the criminal law . . .  not be used to overreach indi­
viduals who stand helpless against it."178 
178. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opin­
ion). 
